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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Status Report on Efforts to Improve
Intelligence Community Coverage of Cuba

- 1. During 1976 there arose in the Central Intelligence Agency a mounting concern over Cuba's growing international role in paramilitary, political, Communist Party, and intelligence activities. CIA was particularly disturbed by the limitations of the Intelligence Community's knowledge of Cuban affairs and the need to improve our reporting and analysis. Accordingly, CIA began a careful examination of its Cuban activities, which soon led to Intelligence Community Staff and NIO consideration of the subject. We have put in train some important actions. The following is a status report on what has been accomplished to date and plans for the future.
- 2. NIC-IC Staff Special All-Source Review: The Community is conducting a review of intelligence coverage of Cuba, called a 'Special FOCUS.' Unlike a regular FOCUS review, which deals only with human resources and which evaluates the performance of a particular mission abroad in meeting intelligence requirements, this Special FOCUS is all-source, covering imagery, SIGINT, and human resources, and deals with a country in which there is no US mission. It seeks to establish new national requirements and related guidance and action strategies for each of the collection disciplines.
  - A. The Special FOCUS began in November 1976 when the NIO for Latin America established tentative new national intelligence requirements on Cuba, concerning internal matters and Cuban activities abroad, after discussion with key policymakers.
  - 3. On 9 and 13 December the NIO/LA held requirements and evaluation seminars on Cuba, which were attended by users of intelligence from both policy and production elements. Two actions have flawed from these seminars:

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- (1) National intelligence requirements on Cuba have been prepared by the NIO/LA and coordinated within the Intelligence Community for consideration by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 17 February. These requirements were placed in order of priority with respect to other countries at a special meeting of the DCID 1/2 Ad Hoc Committee on 26 January 1977. Higher priorities were assigned to a number of subjects to stimulate collection.
- (2) An NIO/LA evaluation of recent reporting on six vital issues pertaining to Cuba, with special attention paid to reporting deficiencies, will be completed shortly and forwarded to the Chairmen of the DCI SIGINT, COMIREX, and Human Resource Committees. Work on this study has already produced three results:

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(b)

C. The DCI SIGINT, COMIREX, and Muman Resource Committees will draw upon the NIO-prepared Prioritized National Intelligence Requirements on Cuba and the soon-to-be completed Reporting Evaluation Study to

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develop separate collection guidance and action strategy packages. The Prioritized National Requirements were formulated in response to users' needs, without regard to collection means or resource implications. Each DCI Committee will determine what is appropriate for its own collection techniques and the related dollar and manpower cost.

- D. The final step in the Special FOCUS exercise will be the development and subsequent implementation of an all-source collection guidance and action strategy using the three DCI Committee contributors, including appropriate trade-offs and other resource adjustments.
- 3. CIA Actions: CIA acted on its initial review of Cuban coverage without awaiting the results of the Special FOCUS. CIA efforts have involved both collection and production, and, except as noted below, can be handled from existing resources.
  - 4. CIA Collection:
    - A. Operations Directorate: The Operations Directorate is taking the following steps towards improving clandestine collection on Cuba:
      - (1) Efforts are under way to assign additional Cuban specialists to overseas positions, subject to approval under the MODE process.

(2)

- (3) The Directorate is expanding its headquartersbased Cuban Operations Group.
- (4) It is also expanding its program of sending Cuban experts on TDY to smaller stations to brief them on the Cuban target.

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	(5) A conference of European-based Cuban specialist was held at CIA Headquarters in October; anothe conference of Cuban specialists stationed in Africa and the Near East was held in January.
	(6)
	(7) In November of 1976, the agreement of the counterintelligence elements of the US military intelligence services was secured for a program of expanded counterintelligence operations against the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI).
B.	
5. CI	A Production: The principal offices in the In-
telligence ligence on the Office	Directorate involved in producing finished intel- Cubathe Office of Regional and Political Analysis, of Economic Research, and the Office of Strategic have taken a number of steps to improve their

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coverage of Cuba.

The Office of Strategic Research has assigned a new full-time analyst to cover Cuban military developments and is proceeding with a study of additional resources required to develop a

research capability on Cuban military.

- C. The Office of Economic Research has doubled its resources devoted to analyzing Cuba's economy, transportation activities, and technical assistance programs.
- 6. FBI Production: A requirement was levied on the FBI on 22 November 1976 for a special report on Cuban intelligence and related activities against Puerto Rico to be completed by 1 April 1977. This will provide the NIO/LA and other key users counterintelligence information on Cuba which touches on their concerns, and which may now be restricted to counterintelligence channels.
- 7. The results achieved so far demonstrate a steadily increasing level of attention to a target which indeed merited far greater Community concern than it had been receiving. Although significant preakthroughs in collection and production have not yet been achieved, as a result of this increased attention we will soon obtain highly worthwhile results in the acquisition of new reporting sources, in improved exploitation of existing sources, and in production more in tune to the needs of policymakers.